Rationalizable Strategy
In a compact continuous game, define $$ S_i(1)=BR_i(S_{-i}) $$ and inductively $$ S_i(k+1)=BR_i(S_{-i}(k)). $$ The rationalizable strategy set of player $i$ is $$ S_i^\infty=\bigcap_{k\ge 1}S_i(k). $$ A profile $s$ is rationalizable if $s_i\in S_i^\infty$ for every player $i$.
Lean scope
Lean's IsRationalizable is defined as surviving iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies (IESDS — see
Iterated Elimination Of Strictly Dominated Strategies), whereas the
best-response definition above (iterated elimination of strategies that are
never a best response) is the MFoGT formulation. The two coincide for finite
two-player games (Pearce's lemma) but differ in general. The Lean port
currently formalizes the IESDS version only, so this best-response node stays
pending until the best-response characterization is linked or proved.
References
- [MFoGT, Section 4.4] Laraki, Renault, and Sorin, Mathematical Foundations of Game Theory. Rationalizability as iterated elimination of strategies that are not best responses.