Mechanism Design
Staged Mechanism Design Topic Catalog
Canonical folder topic: mechanism_design
Local Scope
mechanism_design.basic owns the direct-revelation interface and the first
bridges from mechanisms to strategic games. It should contain the direct
mechanism structure, the induced strategic game, DSIC, ex-post individual
rationality, and the theorem that DSIC truthfulness gives a Nash equilibrium.
Do not put Bayesian priors, transfers, VCG welfare maximization, Myerson payment
formulae, or auction-format specializations in mechanism_design.basic; those
belong to the subtopics below.
Subtopics
mechanism_design.basic- direct mechanisms, DSIC, ex-post IR, and truthfulness-to-Nash interfaces.mechanism_design.transfer- mechanisms with transfers, quasi-linear utility, and parameter layers.mechanism_design.bayesian- Bayesian mechanisms, strategies, ex-ante equilibrium, and revelation principles.mechanism_design.vcg- welfare, payments, VCG mechanisms, truthfulness, and individual rationality.mechanism_design.myerson- payment formulae and monotonicity characterizations.
Source Guidance
- Use [Krishna 2010] Vijay Krishna, Auction Theory, 2nd ed., especially Chapters 5 and 10, for auction-facing mechanism design: mechanisms, revelation principles, incentive compatibility, individual rationality, optimal mechanisms, efficient mechanisms, VCG, and interdependent-value mechanism design.
Boundary
Put auction-format specializations under auction.
Expected Basic Nodes
mechanism_design.basic.direct_mechanism_interface- the direct mechanism structure and outcome map.mechanism_design.basic.induced_strategic_game- the strategic game induced by a direct mechanism, utility function, and true type profile.mechanism_design.basic.dsic_predicate- dominant-strategy incentive compatibility as weak dominance of truthful reports.mechanism_design.basic.ex_post_ir_predicate- pointwise nonnegative truthful utility.mechanism_design.basic.truthfulness_from_dsic- DSIC implies truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium of the induced game.