Mechanism Design Basic Topic Catalog

Canonical folder topic: mechanism_design.basic

Scope

mechanism_design.basic contains the direct-revelation interface and the first bridges from mechanisms to strategic games:

• a direct mechanism structure with report spaces and an outcome map;
• the strategic game induced by a direct mechanism, utilities, and a true type profile;
• dominant-strategy incentive compatibility as weak dominance of truthful reports;
• ex-post individual rationality as pointwise nonnegative truthful utility;
• the theorem that DSIC truthfulness gives a Nash equilibrium in the induced game.

Boundary

Do not put Bayesian priors, transfer/quasi-linear utility structure, VCG welfare maximization, Myerson payment formulae, or auction-format specializations here. Use mechanism_design.bayesian, mechanism_design.transfer, mechanism_design.vcg, mechanism_design.myerson, or auction for those.

Expected Nodes

• mechanism_design.basic.direct_mechanism_interface - direct mechanism structure and outcome map.
• mechanism_design.basic.induced_strategic_game - the normal-form game induced by reports and utilities.
• mechanism_design.basic.dsic_predicate - DSIC as weak dominance of truthful reporting.
• mechanism_design.basic.ex_post_ir_predicate - ex-post individual rationality.
• mechanism_design.basic.truthfulness_from_dsic - DSIC implies truthful reporting is Nash.