Cake Valuation
A cake valuation assigns a value in some ordered value type $V$ to each agent–piece pair $(i, S)$ with $S \subseteq \Omega$: $$ \mathrm{val} : N \to \mathrm{Set}\ \Omega \to V. $$
In Lean: structure SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CakeValuation N Ω V
carrying a single field val.
The value type $V$ stays polymorphic because the canonical instance —
measure-based valuations
([[social_choice.fair_division.divisible.measure_valuation]]) — takes values
in ENNReal, while real-valued bundled interfaces use $\mathbb{R}$.
Normalization
A cake valuation is normalized if every agent values the whole cake at $1$: $$ \forall i \in N,\ \mathrm{val}(i, \Omega) = 1. $$
In Lean: IsNormalized, requiring [One V].
For a measure-valuation $\mu_i$, normalization is equivalent to each $\mu_i$ being a probability measure ([[social_choice.fair_division.divisible.normalized_iff_probability]]).
Normalized cake valuations are the standard setting for comparing proportionality bounds, MMS values, and welfare aggregates across agents.
References
- [AGT Chapter 13] Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, and Vazirani, Algorithmic Game Theory. Valuations on cake pieces.
- Robertson, J. M. and Webb, W. A. (1998). Cake-Cutting Algorithms.