Utility Represents Share Preference
Let $I_1$ be a no-externality share instance ([[social_choice.fair_division.share_instance]]) and $I_2$ a cardinal instance ([[social_choice.fair_division.cardinal_instance]]) on the same population $N$ and share type $S$. We say $I_2$'s utility represents $I_1$'s share preference if for every agent $i$ and every pair of shares $s, t$, $$ I_1.\mathrm{sharePref}(i)\,s\,t \iff I_2.\mathrm{utility}(i)\,t \le I_2.\mathrm{utility}(i)\,s. $$
In Lean: SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.UtilityRepresentsSharePref.
This is the bridging predicate that lets a cardinal instance play the role of an ordinal share instance: whenever the predicate holds, theorems stated against $I_1$'s ordinal preferences automatically apply with $I_2$'s utilities.
Two design notes:
- The direction of the inequality reflects "higher utility is weakly preferred"; the LHS uses the bundled weak preference $\preceq$ in the $s \preceq_i t$ convention.
- The predicate does not require the utility to be unique — many cardinal instances can represent the same ordinal share instance, differing by monotone transformations.
The canonical induced cardinal instance for a given share instance
($I_2 = I_1.\mathrm{induced}$ via
CardinalInstance.inducedSharePref ↔ toShareInstance) automatically
satisfies the representation predicate.
References
- [AGT Chapter 11] Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, and Vazirani, Algorithmic Game Theory. Cardinal representation of ordinal preferences.