Definition Utility Represents Share Preference
definition formalized

Utility Represents Share Preference

Let $I_1$ be a no-externality share instance ([[social_choice.fair_division.share_instance]]) and $I_2$ a cardinal instance ([[social_choice.fair_division.cardinal_instance]]) on the same population $N$ and share type $S$. We say $I_2$'s utility represents $I_1$'s share preference if for every agent $i$ and every pair of shares $s, t$, $$ I_1.\mathrm{sharePref}(i)\,s\,t \iff I_2.\mathrm{utility}(i)\,t \le I_2.\mathrm{utility}(i)\,s. $$

In Lean: SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.UtilityRepresentsSharePref.

This is the bridging predicate that lets a cardinal instance play the role of an ordinal share instance: whenever the predicate holds, theorems stated against $I_1$'s ordinal preferences automatically apply with $I_2$'s utilities.

Two design notes:

  • The direction of the inequality reflects "higher utility is weakly preferred"; the LHS uses the bundled weak preference $\preceq$ in the $s \preceq_i t$ convention.
  • The predicate does not require the utility to be unique — many cardinal instances can represent the same ordinal share instance, differing by monotone transformations.

The canonical induced cardinal instance for a given share instance ($I_2 = I_1.\mathrm{induced}$ via CardinalInstance.inducedSharePreftoShareInstance) automatically satisfies the representation predicate.

References

  • [AGT Chapter 11] Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, and Vazirani, Algorithmic Game Theory. Cardinal representation of ordinal preferences.

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