EconCSLib.GameTheory.ExtensiveGame.ImperfectInformation #
A finite interface for imperfect-information extensive games.
This is intentionally a lightweight structural layer. It records vertices, available actions, transitions, mover ownership, terminal payoffs, and information-set labels. Well-formedness conditions are predicates, not fields, so examples can start small while later theorem statements can assume exactly the conditions they need.
Main definitions #
FiniteImperfectGame— finite imperfect-information extensive game data.FiniteImperfectGame.subgameAt— the same game rooted at a chosen state.SameMoverOnInfo— nodes in one information set have the same mover.SameActionsOnInfo— nodes in one information set have the same action type.NoChanceOnDecisionInfo— information sets are only used at player nodes.PureStrategy— choices indexed by player and information set.PureStrategy.actionAt— induced action at a concrete state.
Finite imperfect-information extensive game data.
info s = none means the state is not in a strategic information set, typically
because it is terminal or chance-controlled. info s = some k places state s
in information set k.
- State : Type u_3
- stateDecidableEq : DecidableEq self.State
- InfoSet : Type u_4
- infoDecidableEq : DecidableEq self.InfoSet
- init : self.State
- payoff : self.State → N → U
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A state is terminal when it has no available actions.
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- G.IsTerminal s = IsEmpty (G.Action s)
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The subgame starting at state s: same finite game data with a different
initial state. Extra validity conditions, such as whether s is a legitimate
imperfect-information subroot, can be imposed by theorem statements using this
operation.
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The initial state of subgameAt is the chosen root.
States in the same information set have the same mover.
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States in the same information set expose equivalent action types.
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Strategic information sets are attached only to player-controlled states.
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Basic well-formedness package for information-set reasoning.
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Re-rooting a finite imperfect-information game preserves the local information-set well-formedness package.
A pure strategy chooses one abstract action for each player and information set.
The action type is indexed by a representative state for that information set.
For a concrete state s, actionAt below specializes this choice at s, so
choices are constant on information sets by construction at the API boundary.
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A pure strategy profile.
Equations
- G.PureStrategyProfile = ((i : N) → G.PureStrategy i)
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The action prescribed at a concrete player-controlled state in an information set.
Equations
- FiniteImperfectGame.PureStrategy.actionAt G σ hinfo hmover = σ k s hinfo hmover
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If two states are in the same information set, a strategy is queried through
the same information-set label at both states. This is the formal
constancy-by-indexing property; comparing concrete action values requires
an action equivalence from SameActionsOnInfo.
Small example #
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- L : RootAction
- R : RootAction
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A tiny imperfect-information game where player 1 cannot distinguish two singleton-action states reached after player 0's root choice.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.