EconCSLib.GameTheory.StrategicGame.PotentialGame #
Potential games: games admitting a potential function that captures all unilateral incentives.
Main definitions #
IsExactPotential— exact potential functionIsOrdinalPotential— ordinal potential function
Main results #
IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nash— maximizer of an exact potential is NashIsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMax— Nash ↔ local max of ordinal potential
References #
- [AGT] Chapter 18
- Monderer, D. and Shapley, L.S. (1996). "Potential Games".
def
StrategicGame.IsExactPotential
{N : Type u_1}
{U : Type u_2}
[DecidableEq N]
[Sub U]
(G : StrategicGame N U)
(Φ : G.Profile → U)
:
An exact potential function: the change in Φ equals the change in
the deviating player's payoff.
Equations
- G.IsExactPotential Φ = ∀ (i : N) (σ : G.Profile) (s' : G.strategy i), G.payoff (StrategicGame.deviate σ i s') i - G.payoff σ i = Φ (StrategicGame.deviate σ i s') - Φ σ
Instances For
def
StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential
{N : Type u_1}
{U : Type u_2}
[DecidableEq N]
[Preorder U]
(G : StrategicGame N U)
(Φ : G.Profile → U)
:
An ordinal potential function: a unilateral deviation improves payoff iff it increases Φ.
Equations
- G.IsOrdinalPotential Φ = ∀ (i : N) (σ : G.Profile) (s' : G.strategy i), G.payoff (StrategicGame.deviate σ i s') i > G.payoff σ i ↔ Φ (StrategicGame.deviate σ i s') > Φ σ
Instances For
theorem
StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nash
{N : Type u_1}
{U : Type u_2}
[DecidableEq N]
[Field U]
[LinearOrder U]
[IsStrictOrderedRing U]
{G : StrategicGame N U}
{Φ : G.Profile → U}
(hΦ : G.IsExactPotential Φ)
{σ : G.Profile}
(hmax : ∀ (τ : G.Profile), Φ σ ≥ Φ τ)
:
A profile maximizing an exact potential is a Nash equilibrium.
theorem
StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMax
{N : Type u_1}
{U : Type u_2}
[DecidableEq N]
[Field U]
[LinearOrder U]
[IsStrictOrderedRing U]
{G : StrategicGame N U}
{Φ : G.Profile → U}
(hΦ : G.IsOrdinalPotential Φ)
{σ : G.Profile}
:
Nash ↔ local maximizer of ordinal potential.