DSIC Predicate

A direct mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive compatible when, for every true type profile and every agent, truthful reporting is weakly dominant in the strategic game induced by that type profile.

This definition treats DSIC as an instance of the library's strategic-game dominance API. The mechanism layer supplies reports, outcomes, and utilities; the strategic-game layer supplies the dominance comparison.

References

• [AGT, Chapter 9, Def. 9.15] Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, and Vazirani, Algorithmic Game Theory. Incentive compatibility, strategy-proofness, and truthfulness for direct mechanisms.
• [AGT, Chapter 9, Section 9.4] Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, and Vazirani, Algorithmic Game Theory. Dominant-strategy implementation of mechanism-design objectives.

Used by auctions

[[mechanism_design.auction.basic.first_price_no_dsic]] (first-price mechanism is not DSIC), [[mechanism_design.auction.basic.second_price_dsic]] (second-price mechanism is DSIC).

Provenance

• Migrated from EconCSLib pull request 27, old blueprint label def:md_basic_interface in blueprint/src/content.tex.