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theorem
proved
Myerson Monotonicity Characterization
For single-parameter mechanisms over real values, DSIC implies monotonicity. Conversely, a monotone allocation rule paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule is DSIC.
The zero-normalized DSIC payment rule is characterized by the Myerson payment formula, yielding existence and uniqueness of the zero-normalized payment rule for monotone allocation rules.
References
- [AGT, Chapter 9, Section 9.5.4, Thm. 9.36] Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, and Vazirani, Algorithmic Game Theory. Monotonicity and critical payments characterize single-parameter incentive-compatible mechanisms.
- [Myerson 1981, Sections 2-3] Myerson, R. B. "Optimal auction design." Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1):58-73. Monotonicity and payment formulae in optimal auction design.
Provenance
- Migrated from EconCSLib pull request 27, old blueprint label
thm:md_myerson_resultsinblueprint/src/content.tex.